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DECREASE OF ‘PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL’ CONFLICTS* 
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Resume: Most of analyses for corporate governance have a company with dispersed 
ownership as a research object. Relevant to this type of company classical conflict „principal-
agent“ is decide by traditional mechanisms of corporate governance and mainly by internal 
mechanisms.  
A significant number of companies from developing countries have concentrated 
ownership. Their typical conflicts are between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders 
(principal-principal), which are reduce by external and internal mechanisms.  
For the countries of East Europe, incl. Bulgaria, adaptation of market principles is 
related to entering of foreign capitals and change of shareholders structure. Arise a necessity of 
researches for corporate governance of companies with concentrated ownership. Traditional 
issue of corporate governance about protection of rights of minority shareholders has a new 
dimension – decrease of deviation between right of ownership and right of control.  
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Corporate governance is traditionally seen by the relationship between shareholders 
(principal) and managers (agent). According to the agent theory, shareholders are dispersed and 
share a common goal - to increase their welfare. Managers are professionals and have a relative 
advantage of dispersed ownership, which is why they are focused on getting their own benefit by 
opportunistic behavior. The discrepancy in their interests leads to conflicts between them. 
Conflicts „principal-agent“ are reduced by aligning the interests of shareholders and 
managers: 
– internal control mechanisms (monitoring by the board and compensation packages 
for executives), and 
– external governance mechanisms (active market for managers and threat of 
takeover). 
                                                          
*
 International conference “Economic Growth: Stimuli and Constraints”, Economic Research Institute at Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, 6th – 7th October 2014, Sofia. 
  
Some authors define the various mechanisms such as substitution, the advantage is 
given to the internal mechanisms (Suhomlinova, 2006). Other authors recommend the creation of 
an optimal combination of internal and external mechanisms in the form of a „package“ (Davis et 
al., 2002).  
 
Conflicts „principal-agent“ are applicable in companies with dispersed ownership 
where there is separation of ownership and control. Most studies of Anglo-Saxon type of 
corporate governance have been conducted on these conflicts. Elements of the external 
environment, institutional framework, are not considered.  
In some economies outside the Anglo-Saxon type, companies are characterized by 
concentrated ownership. The controlling shareholder does not effective transfer control to 
professional managers and reserves for himself the right to control. The managers are appointed 
and represent the interests of the controlling shareholder. The disciplining effect of foreign 
market for managers is reduced and helps to align the interests of the controlling shareholder and 
managers to extract private benefits of minority shareholders. Ineffective protection of minority 
shareholders leads to loss of confidence in the company and they sell their shares or refuse to 
invest. In countries with strict investors’ protection, the concentrated ownership is seen positively 
on the value of the company and its results (Fama et al., 1983).  
The classic agency model for separation of ownership and control is inapplicable in 
cases of concentrated ownership (Peng et al., 2013). Corporate governance practices are 
determined by the institutional environment. The main conflicts are between controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders, etc. conflicts „principal-principal“. Agent theory gives 
way to the institutional theory (Lin et al., 2011).  
The „principal-principal“ model complements the agent theory by focusing on 
conflicts „principal-agent“ according to the institutional conditions. From the perspective of 
institutional theory, practices in corporate governance are defined by formal institutions. 
Institutions, laws and regulations for investors’ protection, in turn are leading forces to form a 
concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 2002). The presence of concentrated ownership in 
combination with low investors protection are roots of conflicts „principal-principal“ 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  
  
 
In practice, the agent theory has two particular cases: 
Model „more than one principal-common agent“ 
The model is applied in situations where principals receive full information and 
compete with each other. The agent performs a number of management roles.  
In economic literature, the model was introduced in historical perspective (Adams, 1996). It 
examines monitoring by the governments of the Netherlands and the UK over their cross-border 
colonial agents in East India Company. Reducing of conflicts is defined as „Hydra factor“ by 
creating a network of communication and accountability.  
In specialized literature, the model is analyzed and used in trading securities (Attar et al., 
2010). Principals have the same motives and time perspectives. The model is adapted to the 
realities - globalization of stock trading (Guthrie et al., 2007): the motives of institutional 
investors vary between shareholder value and social responsibility, timeframes vary from 
increasing the frequency of publication of the reports prior to the public auctions. 
In our view, the model is a real event in corporate governance of financial intermediaries. 
For example, the managers of commercial banks serving the two types of capital: equity 
(shareholders) and quasi-equity (customers).  
General between model „principal-principal“ and model „more than one principal-
common agent“ is the assumption that different groups of principals influence on decision-
making and have a potential conflict of interest (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  
The difference between model „principal-principal“ and model „more than one 
principal-common agent” is in situations. The „principal-principal“ model is used in the presence 
of ability and motives of the controlling shareholder to influence the company when deciding and 
on final results (Young et al., 2008). In other situations, when the agent protects the interests of 
various principals or principals are not able to effectively monitor the actions of the agent, applies 
the model „more than one principal-common agent“ (Arthurs et al., 2008).  
 
  
Model „principal-stakeholder“ 
The model focuses on the conflicting interests of shareholders and other persons 
interested in the activities of the company. The traditional concept of corporate governance limits 
the range of stakeholders to creditors and employees of the company. The modern concept 
considers the effects of the behavior of the company and its results on a wide part of society and 
other companies.  
Conflicts „principal-stakeholder“ is concluded in breach of good practices to 
competitors. Reducing these tensions is done by finding common interests between the company 
and its stakeholders, as opposed to resolve conflicting interests inside the company at „principal-
principal“. 
 
The effectiveness of corporate governance is determined by a combination 
comprising external and internal mechanisms (Gedajlovic et al., 1998). Conflicts „principal-
principal“ occur when a combination of concentrated ownership/control and weak institutional 
protection of the minority shareholders.  
 
External governance mechanisms 
External environment defines governance mechanisms to reduce conflicts in the 
company.  
– The external environment affects the company through legal institutions. Legal 
and regulatory regimes of different countries differ in terms of the security of the minority 
shareholders (Dyck et al., 2004). The size and scope of protection of property rights determine 
the structure of ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1998).  
– Effective market of corporate control stimulates monitoring over the management. 
In the event of poor results, the company is bought or acquired.  
– The level of organisation of the managers market determines the degree of 
protection of property. Impact on conflicts „principal-principal“ gives appointment of managers 
  
of the controlling shareholder of non-market principles. Reduced numbers of managers due to the 
requirement for their approval by the competent authority also contributes to such conflicts. 
– The number of publicly traded companies reflects the level of investor protection 
and access to external finance (La Porta et al., 1997). 
 
External mechanisms are leading in the reduction of conflicts, but they often have to 
be accompanied by internal mechanisms. Internal mechanisms replace external mechanisms 
(Walsh et al., 1990).  
 
Internal control mechanisms  
Institutional environment conducive to effective internal conditions by placing 
regulations (La Porta et al., 1998). In situations of weak institutional environment, internal 
mechanisms implemented a significant role in reducing conflicts in corporate governance (Peng 
et al., 2009).  
– The presence of multiple blocking persons, instead of controlling shareholder, is 
appropriate internal mechanism for resolving conflicts „principal-principal“. The advantages are 
forming a coalition for more effective control over managers than individual controlling 
shareholder. 
– The most effective internal mechanism for the protection of shareholder rights is 
low divergence of the voting rights of payment entitlements. This argument is directly connected 
with the reasons for the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders.  
– One of the most frequently cited reason is entrenchment by managers. It relates to 
organizational commitments that effectively protect insiders of the company from the market for 
corporate control or interference by shareholders.  
– In systems characterized by weak external, but strict internal conditions (i.e. low 
divergence between control and rights to payment), the controlling shareholder has a strong 
motive to increase the value of the company because „nobody steals his own money“ (Peng et al., 
2010). In this context, companies with a controlling shareholder must build a reputation for 
respecting the rights of minority shareholders. 
  
– Effective protection of the rights of minority shareholders. By applying the „one 
share-one vote“ rule is aligned right of property and the right of control, incl. receiving 
information. One of the basic rights of shareholders, voting rights for dividend, incl. liquidation 
and other forms of profit-sharing, is ensured by the implementation of the „one share-one vote-
one dividend“ rule.  
 
Conclusion 
Conflicts „principal-principal“ are reduced by external governance mechanisms (i.e. 
effective laws and regulations), combined with the internal control mechanisms (i.e. low 
divergence of control and rights to payment). The combination creates a situation of low private 
benefits of control and protection of the rights of minority shareholders.  
 
Differences in the institutional environment of individual countries not permit a 
common agency model (Lubatkin et al., 2005). In countries with concentrated ownership and 
legal mechanisms for protection of minority shareholders applied model „principal-agent“. In 
economies with weak institutional framework adds to the cost of agent contracts and prevails 
concentrated ownership (Wright et al., 2005).  
Conflicts „principal-principal“ are common in the countries of Eastern Europe due to 
the processes of privatization and listing on the stock exchange of previous public companies 
(Carmichael et al., 2001). For example, the conflict „principal-principal“ is associated with the 
desire of some majority shareholders to control strategic industries for their own benefit by 
delisting, ie limiting the minority shareholders.  
Conflicts „principal-principal“ may exist in developed economies. For example, a 
partial overlapping of interests between managers and those of other stakeholders, such as 
bondholders (Hart et al., 1995).  
 
The current economic situation is forcing companies to change the shareholding 
structure by attracting foreign capital, most often through the stock exchange. The change in the 
  
shareholding structure leads to new conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. To 
reduce conflicts „principal-principal“ is recommended to use a combination of internal and 
external mechanisms.  
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